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Abstract
Research into word meaning and similarity structure typically
focus on highly related entities like CATS and MICE. However,
most items in the world are only weakly related. Does our rep-
resentation of the world encode any information about these
weak relationships? Using a three-alternative forced-choice
similarity task, we investigate to what extent people agree on
the relationships underlying words that are only weakly re-
lated. These experiments show systematic preferences about
which items are perceived as most similar. A similarity mea-
sure based on semantic network graphs gives a good account
for human ratings of weak similarity.
Keywords: similarity; semantic networks; word associations.
Although similarity is a fundamental concept in cognitive
science, it is still not yet well understood. Any two enti-
ties have a potentially infinite number of features or predi-
cates in common, making it always possible to construct post
hoc explanations for why any items are similar to each other
(Goodman, 1972; Medin, Goldstone, & Gentner, 1993). Even
if similarity is logically vacuous, of course, it is not necessar-
ily psychologically vacuous: there may indeed be a small or
at least finite number of shared represented predicates (Medin
& Ortony, 1989). However, while shared representations may
well explain why people share clear intuitions about the simi-
larity of strongly related items like CATS and MICE, the notion
of shared representations may not apply when the items are
only weakly related. After all, the only predicates that apply
to such disparate items as RAINBOW and TUNAFISH are so
vague and generic that appealing to them to explain similarity
begins to make it nearly as underconstrained psychologically
as Goodman first showed it was in a logical sense.
Despite the questions that weak similarity raises about the
nature of our underlying mental representations, it is almost
entirely unstudied. Almost all investigations into stimulus
similarity have focused on items that tend to be quite simi-
lar to one another – we ask people to compare the similarity
of CATS to MICE, or of MICE and MEN. Rarely if ever do
we ask people questions about weak similarities. We can get
a sense of how extreme this bias is by examining the empir-
ical data for a set of 372 concepts belonging to 15 natural
categories (e.g., fruit, tools, sports), as in Ruts et al. (2004).
We used numerical methods to calculate theoretical values
for the similarities between all pairs of words in a database
of 12,000 word associations. Comparing the two, we found
that the weakest similarities for which we have empirical data
were stronger than 97% of the similarities that were predicted
according to the word association data base. This suggests
that research into similarity has focused almost exclusively
on similarities between only the most related items.
From a methodological point of view, this is not surprising:
if asked to rate how similar HAIL and TEACHER are to each
other, most people would struggle to know how to answer.
Yet this struggle does not necessarily imply that no under-
lying representation of similarity exists. As Goodman (1972)
and others have pointed out, it is always possible to find some
basis for saying that HAIL and TEACHER are similar. The real
question is which of these bases form part of human mental
representations, and whether there exist any systematic regu-
larities in how people spontaneously assess these weak rela-
tionships. The goal in this paper is to investigate (a) whether
these regularities exist, and (b) whether they can be accom-
modated by existing theories of semantic representation.
Viewed as a problem of rating the stimuli between two en-
tities that are only weakly related, the challenge seems in-
tractable. Intuitively it feels like the the similarity between
HAIL and TEACHER is zero, and there is little underlying
structure to be found. However, suppose the task were framed
as a three-alternative forced-choice problem (e.g., Navarro &
Lee, 2002). Which of the following three concepts is the odd
one out: CUP, TEACHER and HAIL? Framed in this fash-
ion, the problem seems less intractable, and many people
have very strong intuitions about what the answer should be.
Sometimes the intuition can be so strong that it may be diffi-
cult to see why the answer to the question is not obvious.
As an illustration, in our discussions of this specific triple,
one author strongly felt that TEACHER was obviously the odd
one out because teachers are people and the other two are not
(an “animate vs inanimate” distinction). Another strongly felt
that HAIL is the odd one out because it is a mass noun and the
other two are count nouns (a “things vs stuff” distinction).
In both cases the choice also invokes quite abstract ontolog-
ical categories, and relies on very broad general knowledge
about the world. Obviously the decision to rely on a partic-
ular category to guide the decision making is the result of
“on the fly” reasoning about the items. Although nobody felt
that CUP was the odd one out, it is interesting that for both
authors the intuitions were quite strong, so much so that they
were somewhat surprised to discover that the supposedly “ob-
vious” choice was not, in fact, so obvious.
This leaves us with an open question: how deep does the
structure in our mental representations go? One possibility
is that there is significant agreement and constraint in our
mental representations only when considering the relation-
ship between entities that are strongly related to each other.
In other words, the Medin and Ortony (1989) argument about
shared predicates may only apply between items that are al-
ready highly related. If this is the case, then one might expect
Goodman’s problem to arise when we try to measure weak
similarities, causing each person’s judgment to be essentially
arbitrary and there to be few stable preferences across people.
The other possibility is that there is enough shared structure
in our mental representations that there is a strong agreement
even for such strange pairings as RAINBOW and TUNAFISH,
HAIL and TEACHER and so on.
In the first half of this paper we present two experiments
exploring weak similarity structure in humans. We show that
similarity ratings of weakly related items are nevertheless sur-
prisingly regular across people, and moreover that similarity
judgments can be manipulated in sensible ways. In the sec-
ond half, we investigate the nature of the underlying repre-
sentations that might give rise to these similarity judgments.
Computational modelling demonstrates that weak similarities
like those found in our experiments can be at least partially
captured by semantic network models constructed from word
association data.
Experiment 1
Our main goal in this experiment was to investigate whether
people reliably agree in their similarity judgments even be-
tween weakly related entities. In order to avoid the difficul-
ties inherent in asking for similarity ratings between two very
different items, we had participants choose which pair out of
three possibles pairs in a triple was the most similar one.
Method
Participants Sixty-nine native Dutch speaking psychology
students participated in exchange for course credit.
Stimuli and Materials The stimuli were 300 nouns taken
from a set of 12,000 Dutch words used as cues in the word
association task described in De Deyne and Storms (2008b)
and De Deyne, Voorspoels, Verheyen, Navarro, and Storms
(2011).1 These items were used to produce triples, which
were sampled at random given two constraints. Each item
in a triple was required to have approximately the same
frequency and imageability rating, in order to ensure that
participant responses reflected underlying semantic related-
ness rather than superficial similarities in concreteness or
familiarity. Word frequency was calculated based on the
log-transformed lemma frequencies taken from the CELEX
database (Baayen, Piepenbrock, & van Rijn, 1993), while im-
ageability was derived from judgments on a seven-point scale
found in De Deyne and Storms (2008a). Within any triple, the
maximum standard deviation was SDmax = 0.52 for lemma
frequency and SDmax = 0.84 for imageability.
Procedure On each trial three words were presented at the
corners of a triangle, as shown in Figure 1. Participants were
instructed to click on the circle corresponding to the side of
the triangle that connected the most related pairs. We stressed
in these instructions that we were interested in the meaning of
words rather than their orthographic similarity or phonolog-
ical relatedness. To illustrate what we meant, we gave par-
1The complete list of stimuli including English translations is
available at http://ppw.kuleuven.be/concat/simon/
Figure 1: Example triple stimulus used in Experiment 1. The
black circles indicate the controls used to select a pair with
the mouse.
ticipants two example triples: in the first one (COLD - HOT
- SQUARE) the first two words are related, and in the second
one (MOIST - COLD - COOL) the last two are. Participants
were asked to do their best even if the task seemed difficult,
and not to dwell too long on a single trial but to complete the
task in a spontaneous manner. The task was presented as a
web questionnaire during a collective testing session.
Results
Our key question was to what extent people tended to se-
lect the same pairs. If weak similarities do not exist or are
not reliably shared by different people, we would expect all
three possible pairs from every triple to be selected equally
frequently. We test this in two different ways.
The first test of inter-rater reliability is to measure how of-
ten the most frequent pair from every triple is chosen. Since
there are three possible pairs in any given triple, chance re-
sponding is 0.33. However, the median value was 0.67 – well
above what one might expect by chance. Moreover, as Fig-
ure 2 illustrates, for 97 of the 100 triples the most commonly
chosen response was selected significantly more frequently
than would be expected by chance.2
Instead of just looking at the most frequent pair of any
triple, we can also measure how much people’s weak similar-
ity judgments agree with one another in a more conventional
way. We therefore ran χ2 goodness-of-fit tests comparing the
observed frequencies across the three responses to a null hy-
pothesis that all three responses are equally likely for each
triple separately. Taking this approach, the frequencies of 89
out of the 100 triples were significantly different from the null
hypothesis, χ2(2), p < 0.05.
The results so far suggest that people encode weak regu-
larities from the environment and do this in a systematic and
measurable way. How robust is this finding? We consider this
question in the next experiment.
Experiment 2
The goal of this experiment is to investigate how robust the
results from the first experiment are. If weak similarities are
not “hard coded” in some way, then they must be derived or
constructed somehow. Perhaps people are deriving them by
searching a semantic network for the proximity of the two
2Note that the hypothesis tests here were conducted using a nu-
merically simulated null distribution, since the sampling distribution
of the maximum frequency is an extreme-value statistic and is not
correctly described by a binomial distribution; it is, however, trivial
to simulate numerically. Using this sampling distribution, the criti-
cal value was 0.39, corresponding to the cutoff shown in Figure 2.
Figure 2: Distribution of the most frequently chosen pairs in
Experiment 1. The vertical line indicates the 95% confidence
boundary for the frequency one would expect if pairs were
chosen randomly. Participants agreed with each other in se-
lecting the pairs for almost all of the stimuli in the experiment.
items to each other, or constructing them on the fly based
on some other underlying representation. In either case, we
would expect that time pressure would cause less accurate es-
timations and more disagreement between individuals, result-
ing in more uniform choice probabilities than were found in
Experiment 1. We therefore repeated the experiment, with the
variation that this time we put participants under time pres-
sure by asking them to decide which pair is more related as
quickly as possible.
Method
Participants Thirty native Dutch speaking students partic-
ipated in exchange for course credits.
Stimuli and Materials The stimuli and materials were
identical to those presented in Experiment 1.
Procedure The procedure was based on Experiment 1, but
a few changes were made to allow for the accurate measure-
ment of reaction times. Instead of using the mouse, partici-
pants were asked to use the keyboard, and to decide as quickly
as possible which pair of words was related. At the begin-
ning of each trial, the triple triangle was presented without
the words until the participant pressed the space bar, which
displayed the words at each corner. Unlike in Experiment 1,
the black circles in Figure 1 were now labeled with either J,
K, or L, and participants indicated which pair was most re-
lated by pressing the corresponding J, K or L key.
In order to make sure participants understood the task and
were answering as quickly as possible, the main test was pre-
ceded by 20 practice items that had the words word1, word2
and word3 as labels at randomized locations. The participants
were asked to click on the letter connecting word1 and word2
as quickly as possible. During this time a warning was shown
when reaction times were slower than 3600ms, and partici-
pants were asked to try to make a faster response.
Results
Before evaluating what effect the time pressure manipulation
had, we first needed to clean up the reaction time data. For
each individual we therefore removed any responses with re-
action times higher than three standard deviations above their
Figure 3: Distribution of the most frequently chosen pairs in
Experiment 2. The vertical line indicates the 95% confidence
boundary for the frequency one would expect if pairs were
chosen randomly. As before, participants agreed with each
other in selecting the pairs for most of the stimuli in the exper-
iment. However, agreement was somewhat lower, suggesting
that the time pressure made them unable to fully access their
semantic representations, adding noise to their responses.
average, as well as reaction times faster than 300ms. The
average reaction time was 3771ms (SD = 2131). A log-
transformation was used to reduce the skew in the reaction
times. Next, for each participants the reaction times were
transformed to z-scores, resulting in a Spearman-Brown split
reliability (zRT) of 0.83. Since we did not record reaction
times in the first experiment, it is not certain that the par-
ticipants actually payed attention to the instructions and re-
sponding faster, as asked. We investigated if this was the
case by running 18 new participants in Experiment 1, this
time measuring their reaction times registered by keyboard
response. The resulting reaction times had a mean of 4705ms
(SD = 2864), about one full second slower than the speeded
judgments in Experiment 2.
We can now explore the answer to our central question:
what effect did time pressure have on the reliability of weak
similarity judgments? As before, we can measure how often
the most frequent pair from every triple was chosen. Remem-
bering that chance responding would be reflected in a value
of 0.33, we find a median value of 0.57. As predicted, this
is lower than the 0.67 of Experiment 1, but higher than what
one would find if responses were random. We also found
that for the vast majority of triples (93 out of 100), the most
common response was selected significantly more often than
would be expected by chance. Figure 3 shows the distribu-
tion of responses. It is evident that, while putting people
under time pressure increases the uniformity of the distribu-
tion of responses, there is still substantial agreement. This
intuition is supported by the χ2 goodness-of-fit tests done for
each triple, which finds that the frequencies within 89 out of
the 100 triplets were significantly different from a null hy-
pothesis under which all three pairs would be equally likely
(χ2(2), p < 0.05).
The results of these two experiments demonstrate that there
is consistent and reliable agreement on similarity judgments,
even when the entities involved are only weakly related, like
CUP and TEACHER. On some level, this agreement is sur-
prising, because such items only share features if so many
features are represented that we begin to run afoul of Good-
man’s problem. Even then, it is unclear that the items on
which there is agreement are the items with more shared fea-
tures. A more likely explanation of this finding may be that
people show strong agreement because they share the kind of
semantic representation that is at least partially captured by a
semantic network. In the next section, we explore this pos-
sibility by modelling the similarities from the two previous
experiments based on semantic graphs.
Graph based models for weak similarity
In this section we investigate the hypothesis that at least
some of the agreement between people about weak similar-
ities arises due to shared semantic network representations.
Network-based models for similarity have been proposed in
related domains (e.g., the NETSCAL model by Hutchinson
(1989) or the feature centrality model of Sloman and Rips
(1998)), but the most similar models in psychology are the
spreading activation models which accounted for a number
of interesting semantic effects (e.g. Quillian, 1968).
Why might we expect semantic networks to capture some
of the representation with which weak similarities are gen-
erated? Such networks probably reflect something about the
way words are combined and used in the real world. For in-
stance, the average American is exposed to about 100,500
words every day (Bohn & Short, 2009). The numerous ways
that this vast amount of information can be combined may
lead to an immense amount of mostly weak contingencies be-
tween items. Indeed, in recent years, the increasing availabil-
ity of co-occurrence information to researchers has led to the
development of models that derive representations of mean-
ing from that co-occurrence. These models, which include la-
tent semantic analysis (LSA, Landauer & Dumais, 1997) and
topic models (Griffiths, Steyvers, & Tenenbaum, 2007), use
statistical methods to extract the regularities underpinning the
co-occurrence data. They thereby produce structured, mean-
ingful representations that can be used to capture and explain
human behavior and performance.
The goal behind network models is similar, though the
approach is different. The network itself is derived from
word associations which presumably reflect the patterns of
co-occurrence in the world. We can then use the network as
the core representation from which similarity measurements
are derived. We theorize that although associations between
individual entities may be too sparse to account for people’s
judgments about triples like CUP-TEACHER-HAIL, the net-
work may capture broader relationships that can account for
such judgments. If broad ontological distinctions like ani-
macy or the count/mass noun distinction are reflected in the
structure of the semantic network, we might expect a suitably
chosen measure of network-based similarity to be able to cap-
ture, at least in part, the manner in which humans resolve the
weak similarity questions that we asked in our experiments.
How, though, can we measure similarity within a network?
We address this problem in the next section.
Similarity in semantic networks
Large-scale semantic models are typically extremely sparse.
In the case of networks derived based on word associations,
this means that the number of edges connecting any two
nodes (words) is very low. This is less of a problem when
dealing with very similar concepts, because they are likely to
share some edges despite the overall sparsity of the network.
However, sparsity is a serious problem for other concepts.
The same problem arises for non-network-based represen-
tations like feature overlap, because the number of features
shared by weakly related items is very low, if not zero.
Given the problems imposed by sparsity, how can we mea-
sure similarity in a semantic network in a sensible way? We
consider two different approaches here. The first is the widely
used cosine measure of similarity (e.g., Landauer & Dumais,
1997; Steyvers, Shiffrin, & Nelson, 2004), which measures
the extent to which two nodes in the graph share the same im-
mediate neighbors. Two nodes that share no neighbors have a
similarity of 0, and nodes that are linked to the exact same set
of neighbors have similarity 1. Formally, it is defined as fol-
lows. Let A denote a weighted adjacency matrix, whose i j-th
element ai j contains a count of the number of times word j
is given as an associate of word i in a word association task.
Each row in A is therefore a vector containing the associate
frequencies for word i. The cosine measure of similarity is
the angle between these vectors, calculated as follows: be-
cause some words can have more associates than others, we
normalize each row so that all of these vectors are of length 1.
This gives us a new matrix G, where gi j = ai j/(∑ j ai j2)1/2,
and the matrix of all pairwise similarities is now
S = GGT (1)
The key thing to recognize about the cosine measure is that
it depends solely on the local structure of the graph: the sim-
ilarities between two words is assessed by looking only at the
words to which they are immediately linked.
Our second approach to similarity aims to take into ac-
count the overall structure of the entire network graph, and
thus to reflect a broader view of the relationship between two
nodes. This measure, similar to Leicht, Holme, and Newman
(2006), is an example of a “random walk” approach to as-
sessing similarity (see Kemeny & Snell, 1976; Van Dongen,
2000; Griffiths, Steyvers, & Firl, 2007, for related measures).
In general terms, the idea is quite similar to the classical no-
tion of spreading activation (e.g. Quillian, 1968). Similar-
ity is thought to be related to the the number and length of
the paths through the network that connect two nodes. If
there are a lot of short paths that connect two nodes, then
it is easy for a random walk through the graph to start at one
node and end at the other; these nodes are therefore more
similar. Formally, the measure is specified by beginning with
the weighted adjacency matrix A. This time, however, we
normalize the rows so that each one expresses a probability
distribution over words. That is, we use the matrix P where
pi j = ai j/∑ j ai j, and then calculate
S = (I−αP−1) (2)
where I is a diagonal identity matrix and the α parameter
governs the extent to which similarity scores are dominated
by short paths or by longer paths. A path of length r is as-
signed a weight of αr, so when α < 1, longer paths get less
weight than shorter ones.3 Note that under this approach the
3As noted by Minkov (2008), this kind of mechanism can help
avoid one of the major criticisms of the spreading activation mech-
similarities can be asymmetric (i.e., si j = s ji). Since our ex-
perimental design forces the empirical similarities to be sym-
metric we use the average of S and ST in our evaluations.
Interestingly, our approach is very similar to the PageRank
measure: X = (I−αP−1)1. For PageRank it is standard prac-
tice to set α to a fixed value of 0.85 (Page, Brin, Motwani, &
Winograd, 1998), where α is bounded between 0 and 1. Our
choice of α was 0.6 and represents a reasonable trade-off be-
tween some degree of decay and a a non-trivial contribution
of longer paths.4
For both measures the similarity indices for each triplet are
normalized to sum to 1. This allows the model predictions to
be directly comparable to the empirical choice probabilities,
which also sum to 1.
Evaluating the similarity measures
In order to assess whether the semantic network based mea-
sures of similarity are capable of capturing the pattern of
weak similarities we observed in our experiments, it is first
necessary to construct a semantic network. In other words,
we must determine the weighted adjacency matrix A from
which our measures are derived. We constructed this net-
work from a large dataset of word associations consisting of
12,571 cues and over 3 million responses. The data come
from a task in which participants were given a short list of
cue words and asked to generate three different responses to
each single cue (see De Deyne & Storms, 2008b; De Deyne
et al., 2011). From this data set we constructed two differ-
ent weighted directed adjacency matrices. The graph A1 only
counts the first response given by the participant, whereas A3
counts all three responses. The graph based on A1 is the
more conventional approach, and its sparsity is comparable
with previous word association studies (Nelson, McEvoy, &
Schreiber, 2004). Because it is based on more responses A3
is somewhat denser, but in both cases the graphs were quite
sparse. The graph A1 included 11,969 nodes and only 0.416%
of the possible links, whereas A3 included 12,420 nodes and
1.176% of possible links.
To evaluate how well the weak similarities from our exper-
iments can be captured using the semantic network models,
we calculated the Spearman rank order correlations between
the network-derived similarities and the empirical data. The
results, summarized in Table 1, demonstrate that both mea-
sures of similarity are significantly correlated with the empir-
ical data. As one might expect, the more global measure of
similarity (the random walk measure) performs considerably
better than the local cosine measure; and the richer network
(A3) tended to produce higher correlations than the network
based on less data. Taken together, the general finding is that
the more data one uses to define the network, and the more
that the similarity measure takes account of the structure in
that network, the better one is able to capture human intu-
itions about weak semantic similarity.5
anism, namely the fact that the entire network is quickly activated
(e.g. Ratcliff & McKoon, 1994).
4Other values of α were tried as well, but did not substantially
change the pattern of results of our experiments
5Within the human data from Experiment 1, there are 28 triplets
that did not share a single first association in our semantic network,
and 72 that did. Because we were concerned that these results might
simply be capturing this difference, we re-calculated the correlations
Table 1: Spearman rank order correlations (ρ) between the
graph-derived similarities and the empirical similarities from
both experiments. All correlations are significant at p < .001,
indicated by the double stars. The more global measure of
similarity (random walk) consistently outperforms the more
local measure (cosine), and that the correlations are stronger
for the denser network (i.e., A3).
Cosine Random walk
Graph Exp 1 Exp 2 Exp 1 Exp 2
A1 .19** .22** .48** .49**
A3 .38** .37** .55** .57**
For Experiment 2, we can extend the analysis to see if the
network measures can account for decision latencies as well.
In general, one would expect that more difficult pairs should
result in longer decision latencies. For each pair, we calcu-
lated the absolute similarity of the strongest pair and com-
pared it with the decision latency of that pair. Restricting our
results to the random walk measure of similarity, we found
a significant correlation between network-based similarities
and decision latencies (ρ = −.22 for the A1 network, and
ρ = −.24 for the A3 network, p < .05 in both cases). This
is again consistent with the hypothesis that the semantic net-
work encodes at least some information used to derive weak
similarity.
Discussion
The work in this paper demonstrates that there is substantial
agreement between people about the similarity structure of
even weakly related items, like HAIL and TEACHER or RAIN-
BOW and TUNAFISH. Moreover, at least some of this agree-
ment can be accounted for by semantic networks constructed
from word association data.
The most striking thing about this finding is that there is
any agreement about weak similarity at all. In the abstract,
there appears to be very little in common between any three
items that are randomly thrown together, and it is not an ob-
vious conclusion that people would agree on how they are
related. In practice, many people have strong intuitions about
any given triplet, just as two of the authors of this paper had
strong intuitions about CUP, TEACHER, and HAIL. Two as-
pects of this are most intriguing. First, there isn’t always
agreement about these intuitions (just as one author thought
TEACHER was the obvious odd one out, and one thought it
should be HAIL). Second, as the data from our two experi-
ments show, there is nevertheless substantial agreement (no-
body thought CUP should be the odd one out).
The main question we are left with is why people should
agree on something like this. There is almost certainly no
external pressure in the environment to do so; it is difficult
to think of any situations in which random unrelated things
are thrown together or used, and people must agree with each
other about them without communicating explicitly. Rather,
separately for these two subsets of the data. The results did not differ
in any substantive way from those reported in Table 1. Interestingly,
27 out of the 28 strongest pairs from these zero-overlap triplets were
agreed upon by the human observers more than one would expect
by chance. This amount of agreement was similar in Experiment 2,
in which 25 of the strongest pairs from 28 triplets were agreed upon
more than chance would predict.
such agreement probably stems from commonalities in the
shared representations underlying the concepts. But what are
those shared representations, and why should they exist at
all? It is clear why it would be useful to represent similarities
between entities that commonly co-occur, or that are often
thought about together – but what benefit is there to building
a representation that will probably never be used, and why do
people seem to build similar ones?
Part of the answer to these questions may come from our
analyses showing that semantic networks built from word as-
sociations can account for at least some of the agreement be-
tween people. This suggests that perhaps the shared represen-
tations measured in our weak similarity task don’t occur be-
cause they offer some benefit, but rather occur as a by-product
of the fact that the mind represents other things. In this case,
it is interesting that networks formed from word associations
capture some of those other things. We can be somewhat as-
sured that the agreement accounted for by the networks is not
the result of trivial or superficial similarities, since denser net-
works did better and things like frequency and imageability
of the words was controlled for. Rather, it may be that these
networks capture, at least to some extent, the kind of deep on-
tological similarities and abstract relationships that drove our
intuitions about triples like CUP, TEACHER, and HAIL.
In light of this possibility, there are a number of areas that
would be interesting to explore in future work. While our
networks did account for a significant amount of the variance
in people’s weak similarity ratings, a substantial amount re-
mains without explanation. One possibility for this is that
our networks, despite being constructed from 12,000 asso-
ciations, are still almost certainly much sparser and under-
specified than people’s actual semantic networks. Indeed, we
found that the denser network constructed from more associ-
ations accounted for the data better. How much improvement
is possible with increasingly dense networks and more items
and associations? That is, to what extent is a large part of
the variance in weak similarity ratings due to the same thing
underlying the associations people make in word association
tasks? How would this compare to networks constructed in
other ways, like co-occurrence in language? How would this
change if the networks were constructed in a more robust
way, for instance, addressing the sparsity problem by infer-
ring missing links, as in Miller, Griffiths, and Jordan (2009)?
Is performance better or worse for different kinds of words,
like abstract vs concrete? Work on all of these questions will
help us to address the fundamental issue of what kind of se-
mantic representation humans have – and how that represen-
tation underlies people’s ability to estimate weak similarity.
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